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1. Introduction 
  Reuters news reports have become an accepted tool for market microstructure studies of 
foreign exchange interventions. A key attribute of the electronic media reports is their time stamp. 
In the absence of actual intervention data, Reuters news reports allow researchers to define a 
narrow reaction window that is measured in minutes rather than in hours or days (see Goodhart 
and Hesse, 1993, for event windows defined in hours and Fatum and Hutchison, 2003, in days). 
Dominguez (2003a, b) and Goodhart and Hesse (1993) use Reuters news reports together with 
intra-daily data to test the signaling hypothesis. Chari (2002), Chang and Taylor (1998), and 
Melvin and Peiers (1995) rely on the same information source to determine if central bank 
interventions dampen exchange rate volatility. In a similar spirit, Peiers (1997) and Sapp (2002) 
work with Reuters intervention announcements to examine issues of price leadership. The key 
assumption in each of these empirical studies is that Reuters news reports are released shortly after 
the central bank has intervened. This conjecture implies that the electronic archives of Reuters 
offer researchers a high degree of precision in the absence of actual transactions data. One 
drawback of this empirical approach is that the qualitative accuracy of the Reuters news reports for 
exchange rate interventions has never been tested. I set out to do this. 
  The accuracy tests of Reuters intervention reports are carried out against transactions data 
from the Swiss National Bank (SNB).
1 The use of Swiss transactions data is interesting because, 
unlike many central banks, the SNB has an open communication strategy. This together with the 
observation that almost all SNB interventions were coordinated with a G3 country guarantees a 
high level of market presence by Reuters.
2 Against this backdrop, issues of time differences 
between the time stamp of actual transactions and Reuters intervention reports and whether the 
Reuters reports are able to capture the number of intervention transactions are examined. Tests 
examining microstructure issues of trading volume and exchange rate volatility are also conducted 
                                                 
1 Osterberg and Wetmore Humes’ (1993) and Klein’s (1993) analysis of the accuracy of newspaper reports for 
central bank interventions may be regarded in many ways as a precursor to this study. 
2 To build on past studies, it would have been preferable to conduct the analysis for a G-3 country. This, 
however, is not possible due to problems of data availability.    2
(see Jorian, 1996). More specifically, I examine whether the number of Reuters reports for day t is 
able to replicate the volume-price volatility correlations observed for the number of actual 
intervention trades. 
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the SNB’s intervention 
strategy and how the interventions are communicated. The same section explains the qualitative 
information of Reuters news reports. The section thereafter presents the empirical results. The 
main findings are Reuters news reports are accurate in announcing SNB interventions when indeed 
an intervention takes place but are deficient in capturing the timing and the frequency of the 
intervention rounds. The last section considers the implications of the Swiss results for other 
intervention studies using Reuters news reports. 
 
2. SNB Interventions and Reuters News Reports 
  This section first outlines the SNB’s intervention strategy and how the intervention activity 
is communicated to financial markets. Thereafter, the transactions data and Reuters news reports 
are discussed.  
 
2.1 Institutional Considerations 
  The SNB intervenes to influence the trend of the exchange rate or to counteract market 
disturbances. Solidarity with other central banks has also been an important motive in the past 
because almost all interventions were coordinated. This however does not imply that the SNB has 
always followed the lead of the G-3 central banks. The Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank, for 
example, have intervened more frequently than the SNB has during the last fifteen years. This is 
further underscored by the observation that the scale of the SNB interventions tended to be small. 
  SNB interventions are conducted in the dealer market directly with foreign and domestic 
commercial banks operating in several Swiss cities. The SNB’s activity in the dealer market is 
limited and should not to be treated as a market maker. SNB interventions are thus based on   3
market exchange rates. It is common for the SNB’s trading desk to gather binding quotes from 
commercial banks before executing an intervention transaction. 
  The SNB communicates its interventions directly with the counterparty. After the 
intervention transaction has been completed, the SNB informs the trader of the commercial bank 
that the transaction was an official intervention.
3 According to SNB officials, the intervention 
announcement spreads swiftly across the dealer market. The SNB makes no formal declaration to 
news agencies that it is intervening. The SNB instead may be asked by Reuters if it has intervened 
in which case a spokesman will confirm or refute the intervention claim. This unique 
communication strategy for SNB interventions is valid for the entire sample considered in the next 
section. 
  The SNB’s intervention strategy may be described as following a shotgun tactic. 
Intervention sessions are characterized by numerous transactions of small volume in a short time 
span. The sessions are generally completed within 10 to 30 minutes. It is hoped this way that the 
intervention’s news is disseminated broadly in the dealer market. The trading volume per 
transaction is most often either $5 or $10 million. On rare occasions is the transaction’s size over 
$20 million.  
 
2.2 SNB Transactions Data, Reuters News Reports, and Data Properties 
  The intervention data used in this study are SNB spot transactions. They cover the Swiss 
franc/U.S. dollar, the Japanese Yen/U.S. dollar, the German mark/U.S. dollar, and the Swiss 
franc/German mark currencies for the period from January 1989 to August 1995.
4 The availability 
of the Reuters news reports determines the starting date, whereas the last SNB intervention in 
August 1995 marks the terminal date. There are three days when the SNB intervened alone: 27 
December 1989, 6 March 1992, and 11 March 1992. The remaining 66 intervention days are 
                                                 
3 The SNB also conducts customer transactions (i.e., passive interventions) for the federal government. These 
trades are transacted in the broker market or as interventions in the dealer market. 
4 Earlier studies using SNB transactions data are by Fischer (2003), Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Pasquariello 
(2002), and Payne and Vitale (2003).     4
coordinated in the sense that the SNB intervened on the same day and in the same direction as the 
Bundesbank and/or the Federal Reserve.
5  
  Table 1 shows the currency breakdown of SNB intervention transactions that were 
conducted on the 69 intervention days. From 1989 to 1995, the SNB intervened primarily in the 
Swiss franc/US dollar currency market, followed by the German mark/US dollar, and then the 
Japanese Yen/US dollar currency market. Only on two intervention days did the SNB purchase 
Swiss francs against German marks.  
  Before discussing the properties of the Reuters news reports, it is important to review 
several uncertainties surrounding the use of this data source to capture Swiss intervention activity. 
At the first level, there is no consensus among empirical practitioners on how much time passes 
between the time stamp of the central bank intervention and that of the Reuters intervention 
announcement. Goodhart and Hesse (1993), on the one hand, write ‘reliable sources confirm that 
in most cases interventions intended to be visible tend to appear on the Reuters screen with a delay 
no longer 15 to 30 minutes.’ Sapp (2002), on the other hand, claims it is less than 15 minutes. As a 
consequence, the intervention studies do not work with an event window of the same size. 
Goodhart and Hesse (1993) measure the difference in terms of one hour. Chang and Taylor (1998) 
examine a 10 minute frequency, whereas Dominguez (2003a) and Sapp (2002) operate with a 5 
minute interval. 
  A second form of uncertainty is that Reuters does not always mention in which market the 
SNB intervenes and never its intervention volume.
6 Most central banks intervene in one or two 
currency markets. In the case of the SNB, there are four and on several occasions it intervened in 
different markets on the same day.   
                                                 
5 During this sample, coordinated interventions arose in the following manner: the SNB and other European 
central banks were informed in advance when the Bundesbank or the Federal Reserve would intervene. It was 
then up to the SNB if it decided to participate or not in the coordinated intervention.   
6 Several studies examining the reaction to U.S. or Japanese interventions mention that Reuters’ headlines give 
information on the volume or the exchange rate.   5
  A third form of uncertainty concerns the proper filtering of the news reports and their 
updates. This is an important issue because no common approach prevails in the literature. Several 
studies such as Dominguez (2003a), Sapp (2002), and Chang and Taylor (1998) use the frequency 
of media reports as an indirect proxy for the number of intervention trades or the number of 
intervention sessions during a trading session. Chang and Taylor (1998) use a filtering rule that 
excludes announcements two hours after the first announcement, whereas Sapp (2002) excludes 
reports that are within the first two hours.  
  Table 2 and Figure 1 present comparative information between the SNB transactions and 
the reported interventions. The main observations are the following. First, there are only six days 
where Reuters failed to report an intervention when the SNB did intervene, however there were no 
cases of false reporting; i.e., Reuters announces an SNB intervention but no intervention took 
place. This latter issue of false reporting did arise in the accuracy studies of newspaper accounts by 
Frenkel et al. (2004),  Klein (1993), and Osterberg and Wetmore Humes (1993).  
  Second, the volatility of the number of SNB transactions is three times higher than the 
number of intervention reports. This difference in the standard deviations also holds for 
interventions in the Swiss franc/US dollar currency market. A further striking feature of the data is 
that simple statistics of Table 2 show that the Reuters reports do not reflect the true intervention 
activity. The correlation between the number of SNB transactions and Reuters reports is 0.21 for 
the full sample and 0.33 for the days when the SNB intervened in the Swiss franc/US dollar 
currency market. This information is also underpinned by the results from the (non parametric) 
sign test, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the distribution of the actual and the 
reported series are the same. 
 
3. Actual and Reported Interventions 
  The analysis on the accuracy of Reuters news reports considers three issues: the timing of 
the first intervention, the relationship between the frequency of the actual transactions and the   6
frequency of the reports, and the relationship between the exchange rate volatility and the trading 
volume. In each case, the empirical regressions suggest that the Reuters reports do not accurately 
capture information from the intervention activity. 
 
3.1 The Timing of the First Intervention 
  Many intervention studies report that the first intervention is the most important.
7 Figure 2 
plots the time difference between the time stamp of the first SNB intervention trade and the first 
(time stamped) Reuters announcement during Zurich trading hours. Positive values denote time 
lags in Reuters reporting and negative values depict “too early” reporting. Of the twenty-one dates, 
fifteen Reuters reports mention that the SNB had confirmed that it had intervened. The remaining 
six reports do not give a source: i.e., dealer or central bank spokesman. The time differences of 
these latter reports are shaded in Figure 2.    
  The limited number of first reported Reuters announcements stem from two factors. 
Reuters news reports falling outside the Zurich trading hours were dropped from Figure 2. Many 
had a time stamp around 23:00 Zurich time (i.e., corresponding to the market’s close in New 
York). These announcements focus on the US interventions and mention only in passing that other 
European central banks including the SNB had intervened. Further, no reported interventions and 
reports without a time stamp accounted for 31% of the missing observations.  
  The evidence from Figure 2 suggests that the Reuters time stamp does not accurately 
capture the timing of SNB behavior. The prior that Reuters announcements follow shortly (i.e., 
within 15 minutes) after the first intervention transaction does not hold. Only three (five) of the 
twenty-one reported interventions fall within the first +15 (+30) minutes after the actual 
interventions. While the average difference between actual and reported interventions is 44 
minutes (with a standard deviation of 61 minutes), the absolute average difference is 51 minutes 
                                                 
7 See Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) and Payne and Vitale (2003) for Swiss evidence.   7
(with a standard deviation of 55 minutes). The time differences are thus frequently larger than the 
30 minutes quoted in Goodhart and Hesse (1993).  
  A more puzzling feature of Figure 2 is that on six occasions Reuters reported that a SNB 
intervention occurred before the first actual SNB intervention trade was conducted. Of these all but 
one were confirmed by the SNB. This result is serious because the SNB confirmation process is 
certainly more cumbersome and time consuming for Reuters than if it reports the FX dealers as the 
source for the intervention news. This suggests that coordination problems existed within the SNB: 
i.e., between the trading room and the press room.
8  
  To understand the source of the outliers in Figure 2, regression results of the time 
difference between the first SNB intervention and the first Reuters report on different measures of 
intervention activity are presented in Table 3. The regressions are based on a limited sample of 21 
observations and need to be treated with caution. They show that intervention activity measured by 
the number of  actual SNB trades (ACTUALt), the time of day (AFTERNOONt = +1 if the timing of 
the first intervention was after 12:00, otherwise 0), coordinated intervention (COORDINATEDt = 
+1 if the SNB intervention is coordinated with the Federal Reserve or the Bundesbank, otherwise 
0), intervention volume (VOLUMEt), or whether the Reuters report was confirmed by the SNB 
(CONFIRMEDt = +1 if the Reuters report mentions that the SNB confirmed the intervention, 
otherwise 0) is unable to explain the time difference. Each of these variables is statistically 
insignificant. This result says that the accuracy of Reuters time stamp is not dependent on the 
whether the interventions are coordinated (i.e., afternoon interventions were frequently coordinated 
with the Federal Reserve and always with the Bundesbank in the morning), the size of the 
intervention, its frequency measured by the number of trades or whether it was confirmed by the 
SNB. Instead, time variables such as year (YEARt) and day-of-the-week effects are more important 
                                                 
8 The SNB press was informed in advance that the SNB’s trading room would conduct interventions at a specific 
time. When asked by Reuters after several central banks had already confirmed their interventions, the SNB 
press responded affirmatively on occasions without consulting the trading room if it had gone through with the 
planned intervention.   8
for explaining the time difference. The results find that the time difference decreases over time and 
is influenced by Tuesday and Thursday interventions. 
  The negative yearly trend in the time difference and the profile of Figure 2 suggests that the 
quality of intervention reporting may have improved over the years. Three observations are offered 
in support of this conjecture. First, the reported time difference for the first three years averaged 72 
minutes (standard deviation 64 minutes) compared to an average of 5 minutes for the latter three 
years (standard deviation 28 minutes). Second, the lions share of the Reuters reports without a time 
stamp or those that fell outside the Zurich trading hours stem primarily from the years 1989, 1990, 
and 1991. Third, probit regressions predicting the 21 observations depicted in Figure 2 find that 
YEARt was the best determinant among the control variables of Table 3. The regressions, which are 
presented in Table 4, find that the time trend is positive; i.e., the probability of observing a Reuters 
report during Zurich trading hours when an intervention occurred increases over time. The 
variables controlling for day-of-the-week effects, a dummy for coordinated interventions 
(COORDINATEDt), intervention volume (VOLUMEt), and time of intervention (AFTERNOONt) 
are found to be insignificant.  
 
3.2 The Frequency of SNB Interventions and of Reuters News Reports  
  Although Reuters news reports do not mention the number of intervention trades, the 
frequency of news reports is used in numerous studies as a proxy for the number of central bank 
interventions.
9  The frequency’s accuracy of the reports can be tested by regressing the frequency 
error on a set of explanatory variables. The frequency error (R_ERRORt) is defined as the number 
of SNB intervention trades for intervention day t minus the number of Reuters reports for t. The 
null hypothesis under this setup is equivalent to an efficiency test of the residual between actual 
and reported interventions; the constant and the coefficients of the explanatory variables should be 
equal to zero. 
                                                 
9 The studies following this strategy are Chang and Taylor (1998), Chari (2003), Dominguez (2003a), Goodhart 
and Hesse (1993), Peiers (1997), and Sapp (2002).   9
  Table 5 summarizes the regressions of the frequency error on a set of variables, again 
relating to intervention activity. The considered variables are the intervention volume (VOLUMEt), 
the number of intervention sessions (SESSIONSt, where a session is defined as a group of 
interventions lasting no more than 30 minutes with time intervals between sessions of at least 30 
minutes), time of intervention defined through an afternoon dummy (AFTERNOONt), and a 








it is the ith transactions price of a SNB intervention for day t).  The 
variables, intervention rounds (SESSIONSt) and exchange rate volatility (VOLATILITYt), are 
motivated by the observation that more intervention sessions and greater exchange rate volatility 
should be positively correlated with the number of intervention trades.  
  The regression results with R_ERRORt provide evidence that the Reuters reports are unable 
to replicate the frequency of the actual interventions. Although the timing of interventions 
(AFTERNOONt) and exchange rate volatility (VOLATILITYt) do not explain the difference in the 
frequency error, the other two variables do.
10 VOLUMEt and SESSIONSt are found to be 
statistically significant at the 5% level, both by themselves and in regressions with other variables. 
A further observation is that the two variables together are able to explain a large share of the 
frequency error; the R
2 is above 0.80%. A simple explanation for this result is that Reuters is more 
likely to dedicate one news report to one intervention trade than devote 100 news reports to 100 
trades. This implies that the relationship is nonlinear; a higher intervention volume or interventions 
in sessions will lead to a greater error in reporting. The p-values of the Jarque-Bera tests in Table 5 
support this claim. They show that the residuals from the linear regression suffer from excess 
skewness and kurtosis. 
 
 
                                                 
10 The insignificance result of AFTERNOONt and VOLATILITYt is robust to alternative definitions of timing and 
exchange rate volatility. Although not shown in Table 5, other factors such as day-of-the-week effects or time 
trends were also found to be insignificant.   10
3.3 Exchange Rate Volatility and Reuters Reports 
  Several studies in the microstructure literature have reported a strong contemporaneous 
correlation between trading volume and exchange rate volatility.
11 Jorion (1996) motivates the 
importance of the price-volume correlation as follows. The price-volume correlation offers an 
alternative perspective on the structure of financial markets by relating information arrival with 
market prices. The correlation also has implications about the probable success of new derivative 
contracts, which rely on sufficient price uncertainty of the underlying asset that cannot be fully 
cross-hedged through existing products. Lastly, the correlation is important for understanding the 
empirical distribution of speculative prices. For the purposes of whether Reuters reports reveal 
intervention activity, the first and third reasons apply. 
  Table 6 presents regression results between exchange rate volatility and intervention 
volume. The volatility variable is defined in four ways: V1t = [max(sit) – min(sjt)]
2, where max(sit) 
and min(sjt) are the maximum and minimum values of the (intraday with 10 minute interval for i) 








is the ith transactions price for intervention day t, V3t is the one-day ahead forecast from a 
GARCH(1,1) model with student-t distribution using the daily Swiss franc/US dollar exchange 
rate, and V4t follows Dominguez (1998) and models volatility as a GARCH(1,1) with student-t 
distribution that includes trading volume as an independent regressor in the variance equation 
again using the daily Swiss franc/US dollar exchange rate.
12  The volume variable is defined either 
to be the number of SNB transactions for day t (i.e., denoted as ACTUALt in Table 6) or the 
number of the Reuters’ intervention reports (i.e., REPORTEDt). The volatility regressions with V1t 
V2t , and V3t are for the 69 intervention days, whereas the GARCH estimates for V4t are for daily 
data, covering the period 1988:1:1 to 1995:12:27. Of interest is to determine how the Reuters 
series matches up with the constructed volatility series. 
                                                 
11 See the discussion in Sarno and Taylor (2001) on page 28 and the references therein. 
12 The daily exchange rates are 11:00 quotes (Zurich local time). The (one-day ahead) GARCH forecast uses a 
sample covering the period from 1988 to 1995.   11
  The regression estimates in Table 6 show that trading volume is positively correlated with 
the different measures of exchange rate volatility, however the strength of the correlations is 
dependent on the volatility measure. While ACTUALt and REPORTEDt tend to corroborate the 
same information for the GARCH generated volatility measures using daily exchange rates, the 
same cannot be said for the two volatility measures based on intraday exchange rates. From the 
reported R
2s, V1t is found to be more strongly correlated with the number of Reuters reports, 
whereas V2t is more strongly correlated with the number of SNB transactions.  
 
4. Is it Possible to Extrapolate the Swiss Results to other Studies? 
  The empirical results in the previous section highlight the importance of working with 
transactions data as opposed to the proxy data generated from Reuters news reports. The 
suggestive but not conclusive evidence based on a limited sample finds that the time stamp of 
Reuters news reports does not closely match the timing and trading intensity of SNB transactions. 
Additional regressions find that the information content of Reuters news reports is unable to 
capture fully the attributes of the SNB interventions. Can these negative results be generalized for 
intervention studies using Reuters news reports for other currencies?  
  The short answer is no. Important institutional features, which differ strongly across 
countries, do not allow the practitioner to determine the direction of the reporting bias for other 
countries. However, the Swiss results do raise issues that have not been addressed in studies using 
Reuters reports by Chang and Taylor (1998), Dominguez (2003), Peiers (1997), Sapp (2003) and 
others. The issues concern the observation that Reuters’ coverage of foreign exchange 
interventions is not uniform across countries and that disclosure practices among the central banks 
have changed over time. These two issues are discussed next. 
  To gain an understanding that Reuters’ coverage is not equal across countries 
comparisons are made with the Federal Reserve, the Bundesbank, and the Swiss National 
Bank intervention reports. On the 66 days when the SNB conducted coordinated interventions   12
between 1989 and 1995, Reuters reported 158 times that the SNB was intervening as opposed 
to 1465 reported Bundesbank interventions and 1637 reported Federal Reserve interventions. 
The large difference in the number of reports between the Swiss reports and the reports of the 
other two central banks suggests that financial markets and Reuters place greater weight on 
news from G-3 interventions than from Swiss interventions.
13 Under the assumption that 
greater Reuters’ coverage leads to greater timing accuracy, this would bias the Swiss results 
toward inaccuracy.
14   
  A further consideration for Reuters news reports to be successful in capturing the timing of 
interventions is that the level of central bank transparency should be high. The standard deviations 
of the time differences between actual and reported interventions should be lower for central banks 
with a high level of intervention disclosure as opposed to a low level of transparency. Chiu (2003) 
notes there is considerable diversity regarding the visibility and disclosure of central bank 
intervention operations. Her survey on intervention practices notes that although the Swiss policy 
of announced interventions through the dealer market has been consistent since 1986, the 
communication policy of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has varied considerably 
over the last fifteen years. While the U.S. and Japanese monetary authorities have engaged in 
secret interventions on a case by case basis particularly in the early 1990s, the intervention 
operations in recent years have been visible.
15   
  Again if the results from Figure 2 are to be used as a yardstick for other studies, then the 
transparency factor would predict that the time differences for US and Japanese interventions 
should not be smaller than the time differences for Swiss interventions for the early 1990 period. 
Frenkel et al. (2004) offer indirect evidence in the Japanese case. They examine the accuracy of 
newspaper reports on BoJ interventions between January 1995 and December 1999 and find that 
                                                 
13 Although Goodhart and Hesse (1993) do not explicitly mention it, their study shows that the frequency of 
Reuters news reports for similar intervention dates varies considerably across European countries. 
14 At the same time it must be recognized that greater Reuters’ coverage requires the researcher to make stronger 
assumptions for the intervention flow, making the empirical results more sensitive to the filtering assumptions.  
15 Chiu’s (2003) survey does not consider Bundesbank practices.   13
the press reports of interventions are an inaccurate indicator of actual BoJ interventions. Their 
results are in line with the earlier empirical studies by Klein (1993) and Osterberg and Wetmore 
Humes (1993) for the United States.  
  The two factors, i.e., reporting intensity and intervention visibility, show it is not possible 
from the Swiss results to make claims regarding the directional bias in the timing error for other 
studies using Reuters news reports. Nevertheless, this study offers a cautionary warning above and 
beyond the newspaper studies of Frenkel et al. (2004), Klein (1993), and Osterberg and Wetmore 
Humes (1993). First, the Reuters reports in this study show that the reporting of an intervention for 
day t is fairly accurate (i.e., correct in 63 of 69 cases with no false reporting). The high percentage 
suggests that future intervention studies using daily data should use Reuters and not newspaper 
reports. Second and more importantly, Reuters reports are accepted by many empirical economists 
as a relatively accurate tool that is able to replicate many of the attributes of financial transactions 
in intraday data. This study questions that ability for Swiss interventions measured by the time 
stamp and the trading intensity. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  Reuters news reports have become an important tool for testing informational issues in the 
microstructure literature on foreign exchange interventions. Although the accuracy of the Reuters 
news reports for intervention announcements have never been formally tested, the combination of 
high frequency data and the time stamp from news reports gives researchers the illusion they are 
operating with a certain precision that is credible for microstructure studies. As such, these studies 
make important assumptions, which have implications as to how the testing framework is designed 
and how the empirical results are interpreted. The objective of this paper is to fill this void by 
examining the accuracy of Reuters news reports against SNB transactions data. 
  The empirical findings are suggestive and not conclusive. The regression results based on a 
limited sample show that the time-stamp of Reuters intervention reports do not match up closely   14
with those from SNB transactions slips. The regressions find that the time difference is best 
captured not with variables reflecting intervention activity such as the number of trades or trading 
volume, but with a negative time trend. This suggests that the quality of Reuters reporting 
improved over the years. The empirical results show that key assumptions made in the 
microstructure literature for foreign exchange interventions are not supported. The standard 
assumption is that the Reuters announcements are concentrated five to fifteen minutes after the 
first actual intervention. The Swiss evidence, however, finds the opposite result holds such that the 
standard deviation of the prediction error can be measured in hours and not in minutes and that 
there is evidence of Reuters intervention reporting before the first SNB intervention occurs.  
  These discrepancies in reporting Swiss interventions raise new questions for future studies.  
Although it cannot be shown that the empirical results for Switzerland apply for G-3 intervention 
studies using Reuters news reports, they do suggest that researchers need to recognize that the 
quality of the Reuters’ coverage may be time and country dependent and that the accuracy of the 
Reuters reports may also depend on the disclosure practices of central banks. These issues should 
motivate future studies to define properly the event window for intervention news and to justify the 
filtering of news reports. 
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Figure 2: Time Difference (in Minutes) between the First SNB Intervention 



































































































































































































Date (Year / Month / Day)
Note: The non-shaded columns are reported interventions confirmed by the SNB. All interventions are coordinated interventions except 92/03/06 and 92/03/11.





Table 1: Number of SNB Intervention Transactions (1989 to 1995)  
    
     
    Dollar  sales     Dollar  purchases 
  
   total  CHF  YEN  DM   total    CHF  YEN  DM 
Number of transactions  405  389  16  0    91  59  0  32 
Number  of  days    58  54  4 0   9 5 0 4 
           
    D M   s a l e s      D M   p u r c h a s e s  
  
   total  CHF  YEN    total  CHF  YEN   
Number  of  transactions  23  23  0     0 0 0 
Number  of  days    2 2 0     0 0 0 
  
 










      Total SNB   Total Reported     Only CHF/USD  Only CHF/USD 
      Transactions  Interventions     SNB Coor-Inter      Reported Coor-Inter 
 
 
Total Observations        519          165        496      138    
Number of days          69                         63                                59                                       53 
 
Number of transactions     
or reports per day 
   average         7.52          2.39     6.67      2.33   
   median         5          2      5      2 
   max           36          9      18      9 
   min           1          0      1      0 
   std. deviation         6.38          1.79     4.22      1.86 
   skewness         2.39*          1.53*    1.14*      1.63* 
   kurtosis         7.18*          3.18*    0.52      3.37* 
    
corr(ACTUALt, REPORTEDt)              0.21                0.33 
  
Sign Test(ACTUALt, REPORTEDt )    0.00                0.00 
Notes: ACTUALt is the number of SNB transactions and REPORTEDt is the number of Reuters reports for intervention day t. * denotes that 
the null hypothesis of no skewness and no kurtosis is rejected at the 5% significance level. The Sign Test considers whether the distribution 
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Table 3: OLS Regressions of the Time Difference  
      
  
Dependent Variable is the time difference between the first SNB intervention and the first Reuters report 
 
  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
 
 
CONSTANT    1158.245*   1056.645*   1081.856*   1116.021*   787.231*    1096.301 
      (263.536)   (246.797)   (253.644)   (274.555)   (203.664)   (262.092) 
  
YEARt    -11.863*   -10.837*   -11.401*   -11.574*   -7.809*   -11.462* 
   (2.805)   (2.578)   (2.766)   (2.908)   (2.250)   (2.792) 
 
MONDAYt    -29.250   -33.014   -31.222   -29.742   -26.427   -29.566 
   (18.295)   (18.163)   (19.550)   (18.462)   (015.831)   (18.598) 
 
TUESDAYt  -56.274*   -55.242*   -58.771*   -60.151*   -68.203*   -57.006* 
      (13.934)   (11.931)   (13.887)   (14.300)   (15.295)   (12.697) 
    
WEDNESDAYt   -17.220   -15.053   -13.990   -13.299   -17.214   -14.872 
      (17.605)   (18.812)   (19.251)   (21.172)   (12.668)   (19.331) 
 
THURSDAYt    78.063*   80.502*   81.077*   85.562*   86.517*   82.677* 
      (22.345)   (23.537)   (24.348)   (24.816)   (20.974)   (23.526) 
 
AFTERNOONt   - 1 . 8 0 6                
   ( 2 . 2 3 6 )                
 
ACTUALt      - 2 . 8 0 3           
     ( 2 . 2 1 4 )           
 
COORDINATEDt       10.526        
       ( 1 2 . 2 8 7 )           
 
VOLUMEt           -1.265 
         ( 2 . 3 8 1 )  
 
CONFIRMEDt            -1.2654 
           ( 2 . 3 8 1 )  
 
R
2      0.82   0.82   0.82   0.82   0.82   0.81 
 
Degrees  of  Freedom    14   14   14   14   14   15 
 
 
Notes: YEARt is the year in which the intervention was conducted; the day-of-the-week effects are captured through the dummy 
variables MONDAYt , TUESDAYt, WEDNESDAYt, and THURSDAYt; AFTERNOONt is a dummy variable +1 if the first intervention is 
conducted in the afternoon, otherwise 0; TRADESt is the number of SNB intervention transaction for day t; COORDINATEDt is +1 if 
the SNB intervention is coordinated with either the Federal Reserve or the Bundesbank; VOLUMEt is the intervention volume for day 
t; CONFIRMEDt is a dummy variable +1 if the Reuters report mentions that the intervention was confirmed by the SNB, otherwise 0. 
Robust standard errors are given in the parentheses and * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 4: Probit Analysis of the Likelihood of a Reuters Report 
      
  
Dependent variable is +1 when Reuters reports an intervention with a time stamp between 8:00 and 17:30 Zurich time on the day of an SNB 
intervention; otherwise 0 (Recall there are no false Reuters reports of a SNB intervention).  
 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
CONSTANT   -33.167*   -31.298*   -33.119*   -33.062*   -36.155*   
   (9.651)   (9.533)   (9.292)   (9.223)   (9.891)   
  
YEARt      0.362*   0.350*   0.371*   0.376*   0.410*  
   (0.107)   (0.104)   (0.102)   (0.101)   (0.109) 
 
MONDAYt        0.200   0.192   0.414 
       (0.506)   (0.507)   (0.517) 
 
TUESDAYt      -0.003   -0.009   0.139 
       (0.462)   (0.467)   (0.483) 
 
WEDNESDAYt       -0.232   -0.246   -0.228 
       (0.556)   (0.551)   (0.572) 
 
THURSDAYt       0.434   0.435   0.689 
       (0.556)   (0.557)   (0.562) 
 
VOLUMEt          - 0 . 0 0 1    - 0 . 0 0 1  
         ( 0 . 0 0 2 )    ( 0 . 0 0 2 )  
 
AFTERNOONt           0 . 5 6 7  
           ( 0 . 4 1 4 )  
 
COORDINATEDt     -0.794   -1.021   -1.454   -1.836 




2      0.18   0.19   0.21   0.21   0.23 
 
Cases  Correct   55   55   53   52   55 
 
Degrees  of  Freedom    67   66   62   61   60 
 
Notes: YEARt is the year in which the intervention was conducted; the day-of-the-week effects are captured through the dummy 
variables MONDAYt , TUESDAYt, WEDNESDAYt, and THURSDAYt; VOLUMEt is the intervention volume for day t; AFTERNOONt is 
a dummy variable +1 if the first intervention is conducted in the afternoon, otherwise 0; COORDINATEDt is +1 if the SNB 
intervention is coordinated with either the Federal Reserve or the Bundesbank. Robust standard errors are given in the parentheses and 
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Table 5: Regressions of (Number of Actual Trades minus Number of Reuters Reports) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Frequency error = (ACTUALt - REPORTEDt) 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
          
 
CONSTANT   5.130*     0.620      -3.428*   -1.290   -1.260   -1.217 
   (0.743)   (0.438)   (1.688)   (0.661)   (1.027)   (1.004) 
   
VOLUMEt       0.066*       0.058*   0.057*     0.058* 
     (0.006)     (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
 
SESSIONSt         6.216*   1.892*   1.883*   1.921* 
       (1.461)   (0.662)   (0.666)   (0.674) 
 
AFTERNOONt           - 0 . 0 2 8    0 . 0 3 5  
           (0.710)   (0.716) 
 
VOLATILITYt             -0.001 
             ( 0 . 0 0 2 )  
 
 
Jarque-Bera Test   0.000   0.006   0.000   0.004   0.004   0.001 
 
R
2    0.00       0.81   0.50   0.84   0.84   0.84 
   
Degrees of Freedom  68        67       67      66     65     64 
 
Notes: ACTUALt is the number of SNB transactions on intervention day t; REPORTEDt  is the number of Reuters reports on SNB 
interventions for day t; VOLUMEt is the intervention volume for day t; SESSIONSt is the number of intervention sessions lasting no 
more than 30 minutes with an interval of at least 30 minutes; AFTERNOONt is a dummy variable +1 if the first intervention is 







it is the ith transactions price of a SNB 
intervention for day t. Robust standard errors are given in the parentheses and * denotes significance at the 5% level. The Jarque-Bera 










Table 6:  Exchange Rate Volatility and Trading Volume  
   
Dependent  Variable:      
          V1t  V1t   V2t      V2t     V3t    V3t   V4t  V4t  
          
 
CONSTANT     8.786*   3.340                  -25.685*     18.421      0.081*   0.083*    -0.002  -0.002 
      (2.197) (4.503)   (6.777) (9.758)   (0.005)      (0.007)   (0.007) (0.007) 
 
ACTUALt       0.631*        8.357*        0.093         0.002*     
   (0.307)       (1.181)    (0.056)    (0.001)         
 
REPORTEDt         4.261*      7.841      0.001      0.005* 




t-1               0.032*    0.032* 
            ( 0 . 0 0 7 )   ( 0 . 0 0 8 )  
 
ht-1               0.912*    0.918* 
            ( 0 . 0 1 9 7 )   ( 0 . 0 1 9 )  
  
 
η  ( student t)              7.120*    7.110* 




2         0.05   0.17     0.58   0.04    0.03   0.01     
      
L             -637.26  -639.26 
  
Degrees of Freedom      67  67    67  67    67   67    2073  2073 
 
Estimation      OLS OLS   OLS OLS   OLS OLS   ML  ML 
  
Notes: The estimation with the dependent (volatility) variables V1, V2,  and V3 are with OLS and robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. V1t = [max(st) – min(st)]








it is the ith transactions price of a SNB intervention for day t.  The volatility variable, V3, is a volatility (one-day ahead)  forecast stemming 
from a GARCH(1,1) ~ student-t model. The volatility variable, V4, is derived from a GARCH(1, 1) ~ student-t with trading volume as an 
independent regressor. The (daily) exchange rate for V3 and V4 is the CHF/USD. ACTUALt is the number of SNB transactions and 
REPORTEDt is the number of Reuters reports for intervention day t. Standard errors are given in the parentheses for V4t and  robust 
standards for V1t, V2t, and V3t. * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 